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The prefix “re-” forms a central axis of Julia Kristeva’s writing and 
thinking. She emphasizes rebirth, revolt, return, re-pulsion, representation, 
rejection, among other renegotiations and repetitions of the past.  One of the 
latest such terms to emerge in her writing, is the notion of reliance, 
specifically maternal reliance, as a rebinding of maternal eroticism.  Maternal 
reliance is a return to the very beginnings of subjectivity and representation.  
It is the rebinding to the mother’s passion or what Kristeva calls “maternal 
eroticism.”  As we will see, the mother’s passion or maternal Eros is what 
supports the child’s entrance into language. Already immersed in 
signification from birth, the child learns language proper through the 
support of the mother’s love.  But, on Kristeva’s account, the mother’s love is 
a kind of circuit that returns to the child through the paternal function, 
specifically what she calls the imaginary father.   
In my brief remarks, I would like to consider what it means to return 
and rebind—that is to say, the significance of the “re-“ for Kristeva’s 
thought.  Kristeva does not just talk about binding or birth, or unbinding or 
death, but rather about rebinding and rebirth, suggesting that it is a 
retrospective return rather than an original moment that is crucial.  The most 
significant moment, then, is not the moment of imaginary plenitude, nor the 
moment of originary loss, but rather the moment of rebirth that comes 
through rebinding.  Indeed, Kristeva’s insistence on re-turning suggests that 
there is no originary moment of plenitude, of castration or loss, but rather a 
constant movement of compensation for a recurrent loss.  By emphasizing 
rebinding and rebirth, she underscores not the loss as cutting wound but 
rather the healing power of signification, always already inherent within 
loss.  The flipside of separation is reattachment.  And rather than just focus 
on the separation or cut, Kristeva looks to that which allows us to rebind 
and reattach in order to create relations that sustain us.  Both unbinding and 
binding are necessary for rebinding.  Thus, by focusing on rebinding, 
Kristeva insists on the process of unbinding and binding, and the oscillation 
between them.   
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One reason that Kristeva focuses on rebinding rather than binding or 
unbinding may be the fantastic status of what Freud might call the primal 
scene.  If there is no originary experience, then all experiences are repetitions 
of an imaginary scene that continues to haunt the psyche.  Psychic energy 
can become attached to a foundational fantasy that drives it.  This fantasy 
will be repeated in various forms throughout the life of the psyche.  And yet, 
Kristeva remains optimistic that these patterns of repetition can be 
interrupted and that new forms of revolt are possible through rebinding 
psychic energy.   
The repetitive nature of psychic experience is another reason that 
Kristeva emphasizes the return as retrospective rebinding.  Binding is never 
once and for all but rather a continual process of binding, unbinding, and 
rebinding.  The time of the psyche as described by Freudian psychoanalysis 
is one of repetition and return.  And, Kristeva insists that psychoanalysis 
must follow the lead of psychic time by interminably turning back on itself 
through analysis.  Rebirth and rebinding, then, are interminable processes 
through which the speaking subject negotiates and renegotiates the wound 
at the center of the psyche, the split between being and meaning.  Insofar as 
we are beings who mean, we are cut off from our being in-itself, always 
searching for ways to reunite with our own being in-itself.  This search is 
what Freud called the death drive.  He postulated the death drive to explain 
why human beings—and perhaps all living beings—tend toward stasis 
rather than tension, even when that tension is pleasurable.  In other words, 
both the tension inherent in pleasure and in displeasure is overcome by 
stasis or a steady state devoid of tension.  In human beings, one way to view 
the death drive is as the drive toward being, which is always in conflict with 
the drive for meaning.  The idea is that to “just be” would be without 
tension, while the search for meaning is the essence of tension.  Of course, 
this assumes that beings that are not self-conscious do not experience 
psychic tension.   
One way to interpret Kristeva’s insistence on rebinding, then, is through 
Freud’s theory of cathexis in terms of bound and unbound drive energy, 
which he introduced in “Project for a Scientific Psychology” as an economic 
theory of the drives and developed later in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 
relation to the repetition compulsion.1  In the “Project,” Freud describes 
binding as the inhibition of free psychic energy linked to neurons firing in 
the brain as they become associated with concrete ideas or memories and 
therefore “bound” to them.  Free energy is associated with the instincts or 
drives while bound energy is drive energy put in the service of stabilizing 
the ego.  In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, bound and unbound energies are 
not necessarily linked to biological processes in the brain, but rather to the 
primary and secondary processes of the psyche.  There, Freud discusses the 
binding process not only as continually taking place, but also as the motor of 
psychic functioning.  Unconscious drives are constantly being bound to 
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ideas, images and memories, which make their way into consciousness to 
varying degrees.  In analysis, the repetition compulsion can make manifest 
these psychic connections through which a particular drive is linked over 
and over again to a certain idea.  Given that the repetition compulsion 
repeats traumatic and unpleasant experiences, the project of analysis is to 
unbind and rebind this drive force into something more positive and less 
painful for the analysand.   
Kristeva puts an emphasis on the rebinding operation of analysis.  In 
light of Freud’s remarks on binding and unbinding in his later work, 
Kristeva’s focus on re-binding can be interpreted as calling attention to how 
the unbound energy of the death drive can be rebound and put into the 
service of life.  For, as Freud describes them, bound energy is the result of 
Eros and serves life, whereas unbound energy is the result of Thanatos and 
serves the death drive.2  Binding helps establish unity while unbinding 
destroys unity, which is why binding is associated with stabilizing the ego.   
Extending Freud’s theory of bound and unbound energy to Kristeva’s 
notion of “new revolt,” rebinding or reliance appears as the re-binding of 
drive energy, particularly of the death drive, to more productive 
sublimatory creations and forms of signification in order to avoid the 
extremes of either falling into the death drive and identifying with it 
(embracing it with a wish for death) or disavowing the death drive by fixing 
an ideal and denying change.  The latter of these extremes easily topples 
over into the former; and therefore, they go hand in hand.  Kristeva 
describes “the malady of ideality” as either of these—the nihilist who 
believes in nothing or the suicide bomber who kills others and himself or 
herself in the name of an absolute ideal.     
Kristeva identifies this fundamentalism of belief with adolescence.  
Beyond the childish wonder at the world with its continual questioning 
“why,” the adolescent looks for something to believe in.  The adolescent 
wants to believe in an absolute truth or eternal love, a soul mate, something 
to replace its parents, who have proved a disappointment.  The adolescent, 
says Kristeva, is a true believer, who either embraces an absolute ideal or 
gives up all ideals and embraces the death drive.  Both extremes can amount 
to the same thing if the adolescent turns to violence in the name of one 
extreme or the other.  The adolescent cannot move beyond the need to 
believe and is doggedly fixed there rather than risk questioning and 
uncertainty. 
Kristeva associates the need to believe with sensation, a sort of trust in 
one’s senses.  She describes belief not as a supposition but rather as an 
unshakeable sensorial certainty.  Before Oedipus, before language, before 
representation, there is the need to believe, which is supported by the 
imaginary father.  Kristeva identifies the imaginary father with “paternal 
listening” that “gives meaning to what would otherwise be an inexpressible 
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trauma,” most especially the separation from the maternal body.3  This 
father is the one whom the mother loves, or the one whom the child 
imagines the mother loves.  This father is the object of the mother’s desire 
such that, not only is the child forced to separate from the mother, but also it 
sees that it too is an object of her affection.  Because she loves another, she is 
capable of loving me.  Kristeva adds that the imaginary father also provides 
positive representations for the child.  This father, loved by the mother, also 
loves and supports the child, if only indirectly through the mother’s love.  
Signification, representation, and language are possible because of the 
connection between love and belief.  Loving support in the circuit between 
the mother and the father (real and/or imaginary) enables the child to 
separate from the mother in order to love her.   
In “New Forms of Revolt,” Kristeva postulates the need to believe as 
separate from the desire to know.  She maintains that although the need to 
believe is primary, a meaningful life also requires the desire to know.  It is 
noteworthy that Kristeva uses the terms need and desire here, given their 
history within Lacanian psychoanalysis.  For Lacan, desire is what is left 
over once we subtract need from demand.  This is to say that desire is the 
remainder between having to ask for what you want or need and actually 
getting it.  Given that what the child wants is to have its needs met 
automatically without having to ask, the necessity of making a demand (or 
asking) insures that its needs will never be met completely, and therefore, it 
will become a desiring subject, always experiencing as much loss and lack as 
satisfaction.  For Kristeva, we need to believe just as we need to eat and 
sleep.  But we desire to know because of the gap between our belief or 
ability to believe and the satisfaction of that need through signification.   
Because we can never say completely once and for all what we mean when 
we try to express our beliefs, there is always a remainder when we subtract 
what we mean from what we say.  Language never fully captures 
experience, which is why we keep speaking.  The remainder between 
experience and language corresponds to the gap between need and desire 
once demand enters the scene.  In other words, because we must express our 
beliefs in language, they are always already put into doubt.  And yet, in 
order to take the first step, we must believe--we need to believe.  We need to 
believe we can say what we mean, and that what we say can be understood 
by others.  This is a matter of faith that founds the possibility of 
communication. Of course, certainty of knowledge is impossible and 
therefore desire is always the oscillation between lack and satisfaction.  
Kristeva calls this movement the “eternal turnstile” of the need to believe 
and the desire to know.  We are always moving back and forth between 
them, between certainty and questioning.   
The adolescent is stuck at the need to believe stage to the point that the 
desire to know may seem threatening.  No longer comfortable questioning 
everything, the adolescent needs certainty and security.  Kristeva claims that 
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the analyst must convince the adolescent that there is pleasure in 
questioning, which she associates with revolt.  This is to say, adolescent 
violence is not a new form of revolt.  Protests in the street are not what 
Kristeva has in mind when she says revolt.  Indeed, in Kristeva’s terms, this 
is the opposite of revolt insofar as it forecloses questioning, and is too often 
the result of belief in an absolute ideal or fixed idea.  The ability to revolt 
through questioning traditions and norms is threatened by what Kristeva 
calls “adolescent gangster fundamentalism.” It is important to note that she 
also says that everyone is a perpetual adolescent insofar as we all need to 
believe and we all crave certainty.   
And yet, she finds contemporary revolt, or new forms of revolt, which 
not only dwell with questions, but also find pleasure in continually 
questioning.  What she calls “this new species of rebels” share something if 
not new, then only recently acknowledged, namely that meaning comes 
from “a radical inner experience” rather than from something outside or 
located in the social, historical or political.  This inner experience is related to 
what she calls “intimate revolt.”   Inner experience is psychic life or psychic 
space, which is where intimate revolt takes place.  In New Maladies of the 
Soul, she described intimate revolt as a way of making the clichés of one’s 
culture one’s own.4  Intimate revolt is an engagement between inner 
experience and the outer world.  In this way, intimate revolt is an 
engagement between the deeply personal or this radical inner experience 
and the social, historical and political.  Kristeva is clear, however, that 
intimate revolt is different from political revolt.  Whereas most political 
revolt seeks to overthrow the old and establish something new in the name 
of some absolute ideal, intimate revolt neither dispenses with the old nor 
postulates something new, and certainly not in the name of an absolute 
ideal, unless that ideal is constant questioning and interminable analysis.  In 
a sense, then, we could say that the value of values is in questioning them.   
It may seem odd that Kristeva is attempting to articulate what is new 
about contemporary revolt while simultaneously chastising contemporary 
culture for fetishizing the new.  She is critical of the constant clamor for 
newness even while she seems to bemoan the lack of greatness in art and 
literature today.  Newness, she seems to suggest, like revolt, has become 
intimate.  No longer the grand social, historical and political gestures of 
political revolutionaries and great artists, revolt and newness have taken a 
turn inward to occupy psychic space.  And yet, Kristeva tells us, perhaps it 
has always been the case that true revolt happens in the imagination; true 
revolt has always been intimate revolt.  In any case, she concludes that 
grand revolt is no longer possible for us, inundated, as we are, with the 
society of the spectacle that levels everything and overwhelms with quantity 
over quality.   We are left with what she calls a “decorative ghetto,” which 
could mean that we are left with poverty of meaning and mere decoration, 
or that we valorize the ghetto, and that ghetto aesthetic has become the new 
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art form.  Either way, she suggests that there is a crisis of meaning caused by 
the society of the spectacle that can be addressed through the reformation of 
intimate revolt--that is to say, reforming a meaningful life through 
questioning and analysis that is intimate and personal.   
Given that the crisis in meaning is caused in part by the inability of 
religion to fill the void left in the wake of constant screen time, we might be 
tempted to say that in the place of new age Christianity with its turn to a 
“personal knowledge,” Kristeva offers us a personal revolt in the form of 
intimate revolt, which takes place in our personal inner experience.  Revolt 
has become personal rather than global.  Meaning has become intimate 
rather than universal.  And what is unique or new in contemporary life is 
our ability, or willingness, to admit it.  Straddling old and new, personal and 
political, Kristeva’s new revolt could be interpreted as either waffling and 
uncertain or as embracing the ambiguity of a space in between, embracing 
the fluidity and ambivalence of psychic space with its intimate revolt, or 
more precisely, its interminable intimate revolts.   
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